Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
T he ability of the federal government to stimulate retirement saving through tax policy is a central economic policy issue and often a point of contentious debate in the literature. Since 1981, when the Internal Revenue Service issued clarifying regulations, 401(k)-type pension arrangements have grown remarkably and become the primary vehicle for retirement saving in the United States. As is well known, 401(k)s subsidize saving through income-tax deferral on wages and salary dedicated to retirement saving and through investment accrual at the pre-tax interest rate. When compared with their closest substitute, Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), contributions to which, for many households, have limited or no tax deductibility, 401(k)s by far have the greatest tax advantages, especially for workers eligible for employer matching contributions.
Despite the important role that 401(k)s play in policy debates about the adequacy of retirement saving and the voluminous literature on their effect on household saving, there has been virtually no analysis of the effect of tax policy on 401(k) saving behavior. This is striking, given that, traditionally, the presumed mechanism by which 401(k)s raise saving is through the substitution effect from the preferred tax treatment. In addition, the focus of previous studies has been on the effect of employer matching on 401(k) saving. But there is little consensus as to what this effect is. In fact, some studies have suggested that conditional on being eligible for a match, an increase in the match rate lowers 401(k) contributions, which, if correct, suggests that the income effect dominates the substitution effect from the higher rate of return matching provides. This paper uses a unique dataset on households in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to examine the responsiveness of 401(k) saving to tax policy, employer matching, and lifecycle factors. Specifically, the analysis is based on panel data from W-2 earnings records for jobs held in 1984-1991 by HRS individuals. Because elective deferrals to 401(k)-type pension plans appear as the difference between federal and FICA wages on the W-2, we are able to construct a panel dataset on 401(k) contributions from these records. We then match these data to selfreported income, demographic, and pension information from wave 1 (1992) of the HRS, as well as Social Security coveredearnings histories back to 1951 from the Social Security Administration (SSA), and information taken from employer-provided summary plan descriptions for all eligible pensions from employers.
Unlike the small number of previous studies, these combined data sources allow us to model 401(k) saving longitudinally as a function of taxes, lifetime earnings and characteristics of the 401(k) and other pension plans for which the household is eligible. Importantly, we can exploit the panel data to account directly for unobserved heterogeneity in saving behavior. Based on the maximum likelihood random effects estimates of the determinants of 401(k) contributions, there are two primary findings. First, the limit on the tax deductibility of IRA contributions enacted in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) is associated with an increase in 401(k) saving of 6 percent. So, tax policy matters. Second, employer matching is associated with a substantial increase in 401(k) saving, but this result is not robust once job and firm characteristics are taken into account.
The analysis yielded some other interesting findings. Alternative pension coverage (by plans other than a 401(k)) greatly reduces 401(k) saving. This suggests a significant pension-saving offset, in the range found by Gale (1998) , among others. In addition, the estimates imply a small Social Security offset to 401(k) saving. Finally, although it is difficult to ascribe causality, the ability of the participant to direct the investment of the voluntary balance in the 401(k) is associated with a substantial increase in 401(k) . This is consistent with the prior work of Papke (2002) .
The paper is organized as follows. The second section reviews the existing literature. The third section describes the construction of the dataset. The fourth section lays out the econometric framework, the construction of the key variables, and discusses the estimation results. There is a brief conclusion.
EXISTING LITERATURE
Previous studies can be categorized in part by the source of data used. The main sources have been the May, 1988 and April, 1993 pension supplements to the Current Population Survey (CPS).
1 These supplements inquired whether the individual was offered a 401(k)-type pension plan, currently participated, the amount of the contribution, and whether the employer provided matching contributions. In addition, the CPS obtained detailed in- 1 We confine the discussion to studies of individual-level 401(k) participation. There are a number of studies of 401(k) participation that have utilized firm-level data. Papke (1995) used Form 5500 firm-level data for 1986 and 1987 and focused on the effect of employer match rates on participation and contribution behavior. She found that participation increased substantially when the match rate moved from zero to a positive rate. However, increased match rates were associated with lower participation at high positive match rates. General Accounting Office (1997) used the Form 5500 data from 1992 and found similar results.
formation on income and demographic characteristics, such as marital status, race, age, and number of children, as well as employer characteristics, such as industry, union status, and the number of employees at the firm. These studies have defined an individual as having "participated" in a 401(k) if the individual contributed during the survey year. Given this definition, participation typically has been modeled as a function of the employer match rate, income, education, tenure, occupation, industry, demographic characteristics, and a dummy for whether the 401(k) is the main pension plan. For example, Andrews (1992) used the May, 1988, CPS. She found that the probability of participating in a 401(k) rose with household income, age, tenure, the existence of an employer match, and if the 401(k) was the sole pension plan. In addition, she found that participants' contributions rose with household income and age, but fell with the existence of an employer match. Even and Macpherson (1996) used the May, 1988, and April, 1993 , CPS surveys and found that the probability of participating rose with household income, education, tenure, the existence of an employer match, and if the 401(k) was the sole pension plan. They also found that participation was higher for whites than nonwhites, other things equal. Employee Benefit Research Institute (1994) also used these surveys, found comparable results, and, similar to Andrews (1992) , found that the contribution rate was lower if there was an employer match. Bassett, Fleming, and Rodrigues (1998) used the April, 1993, CPS and found that participation rose with household income, age, tenure, home ownership, the existence of an employer match, and if the 401(k) was the sole pension plan. They also found that participation was lower for married than non-married individuals, other things equal. In addition, education had a hump-shaped effect on participation: other things equal, those with a high school diploma had a greater likelihood of participating than those with no diploma or those with a college degree.
General Accounting Office (1997) used the 1992 Survey of Consumer Finances to examine the determinants of the 401(k) contribution rate out of earnings. The contribution rate was modeled as a linear function of gender, marital status, race, whether there was other pension coverage, the log of the employer match rate, and whether the plan had premature withdrawal provisions, and a non-linear function of age, education, income, and wealth. The primary finding was that the contribution rate was higher for whites, if covered by another plan, and if able to withdraw the funds. Contributions also rose with income, non-pension, non-Social Security wealth, and the employer match rate. In addition, the contribution rate was hump-shaped in age, with the peak for individuals who were 45 to 54.
Munnell, Sunden, and Taylor (2001) studied the determinants of 401(k) participation and contribution behavior using the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). Their probit estimates indicated that the likelihood of contributing rose with job tenure, planning horizon, income, private net worth, and defined benefit pension wealth, and was humpshaped in age. In addition, they estimated by ordinary least squares models of the determinants of contributions on the subsample of contributors. They found contributions as a percent of income were 8 percentage points higher for individuals who self-reported being in plans with an employer match, but conditional on having a match, larger match rates lowered contributions. Papke (2002) used two datasets, the National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Women (NLS-MW) and the HRS, and examined the effect of the ability of participants to direct the investment of their 401(k) account balances on participation.
She estimated that those with investment choice were 36 percent more likely to make an annual contribution, made a larger contribution (conditional on contributing), and invested more heavily in equities than those without choice. This resulted in those with choice having larger 401(k) account balances.
While only Joulfaian and Richardson (2001) have used income tax data to study 401(k) participation, a few studies have used administrative data from one or more companies to examine 401(k) participation within a firm. Clark and Schieber (1998) used administrative data on individual employees for 1994 at 19 firms.
2 They modeled the individual's probability of participation as a linear function of the number of employees at the firm, dummy variables for various match rates, dummy variables for the quality of communications about the 401(k) plan to employees, and as a quartic function of age and earnings. Some specifications also controlled for the replacement rate on other pensions offered. They found that participation rose with the match rate. In addition, participation rose with increased communication about the 401(k) plan. Participation also rose with earnings and age, although it declined slightly for workers very close to normal retirement age. Kusko, Poterba, and Wilcox (1998) used panel data on employees of a single firm and examined the effect of changes in the employer match rate on employee participation and contributions. They found a great deal of persistence in 401(k) contribution behavior. For example, an individual who contributed in one year had a greater than 90 percent probability of having contributed in the subsequent year. In addition, they found little sensitivity of contributions to changes in the employer match rate.
Finally, in a fascinating set of studies, Madrian and Shea (2001) and Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2001a,b) have examined the effect of automatic enrollment and other plan features on 401(k) participation. They used detailed administrative data on 401(k) behavior for a set of firms. They found that automatic enrollment (with the ability to opt out) substantially raises 401(k) participation. However, many participants tend to use the default contribution rates and investment vehicles as focal points, so that in some cases, 401(k) saving can be lower for some individuals than if the plan allowed voluntary enrollment. More broadly, these studies use "behaviorial" theories to explain 401(k) saving phenomena not easily accounted for by traditional saving frameworks.
There are a number of limitations of these previous studies. First, and surprisingly, none have examined the responsiveness of 401(k) saving to taxes. Because tax savings rise with marginal tax rates, and income and marginal tax rates are highly positively correlated, most of the previous estimates of the effect of income on participation are likely upward biased by the omission of taxes from the participation model. Furthermore, even if taxes had been included, many of these studies used only cross-sectional data, with which it is extremely difficult to convincingly disentangle the income from the tax price effects. Joulfaian and Richardson (2001) is an exception in this regard.
Second, most previous studies of 401(k)'s have omitted measures of Social Security and non-401(k) pension coverage because the datasets analyzed lacked sufficient detail on pension characteristics and covered-earnings histories needed to accurately measure these variables. This omission is problematic, for the decision to save for retirement through a 401(k) should be related to a large extent to the amount of wealth already accumulated for retirement in other forms.
Third, there may be significant measurement error on pension plan characteristics from the self-reported data asked in surveys such as the CPS and SCF. Studies that compared self-reported pension characterstics versus those from the employer's Summary Plan Description (SPD), such as Steinmeier (1989,1999) , Engelhardt (2001) , Mitchell (1988), and Starr-McCluer and Sunden (1999) , have found substantial evidence of measurement error in self-reported pension data. This has important implications for the simple measurement of 401(k) eligibility.
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In addition, because many of the survey questionnaires do not ask pension questions in great detail, individuals quite unintentionally may misreport voluntary contributions to a 401(k). For example, the SCF asks the amount the individual contributed (per time period or as a percent of pay) to a pension plan. 4 However, the SCF does not ask whether these contributions were mandatory, in the sense they were required by the plan as a condition of eligibility, or whether they were truly voluntary. So, analyses based on the selfreported data overstate voluntary participation and contributions. As shown below later, mandatory employee pre-tax contributions to pensions are not infrequent and can be nontrivial in magnitude, so that this is a legitimate concern. Likewise, employer match rates are often constructed from questions about whether the employer contributes to the plan. While these employer contributions could be truly employer matches, they also could be employer contributions for another part of the plan if the pre-tax voluntary component was amended to an existing profit sharing or money-purchase plan. Without detailed questions about matching of voluntary contributions, it is extremely difficult to correctly measure the effect of employer matching on voluntary 401(k) saving.
DATA DESCRIPTION AND SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION
This study addresses a number of the shortcomings in the previous literature by examining the effect of federal tax policy, employer matching, Social Security and non-401(k) pensions on 401(k) saving behavior using a rich dataset constructed from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). This dataset is designed to circumvent many of the worst measurement issues that have plagued previous studies. Specifically, the household-level data used in the empirical analysis below were drawn from wave 1 of the HRS. The HRS surveyed individuals born between 1931-41 and their spouses (regardless of birth year). In addition to information on demographics, income, wealth, health, and housing, it has detailed data on pensions and job histories. These data come from two sources. First, individuals working at the time of the interview (1992) were asked detailed questions about their current job, including industry, occupation, starting pay, current pay, union coverage, self-employment, and pension coverage. Specifically, the pension sequence started with a question about whether the individual was covered by a pension or taxdeferred saving plan through the job or 3 Specifically, individuals may misreport plan type. This could occur for a number of reasons: someone with a defined benefit reports a defined contribution plan (or vice versa); someone with a non-401(k) defined contribution plan reports a 401(k); someone with a defined benefit and 401(k) plan reports just the defined benefit plan, etc. In any of these (or the many other possible) cases, 401(k) eligibility, will be measured incorrectly in self-reported data. 4 The SCF is used as an example here, but similar criticisms apply to the CPS. 5 This was done in Section F of the survey. union. Those that answered affirmatively were then led through a sequence of questions about as many as three plans. For those individuals not working at the time of the interview, a similar sequence of job and pension questions was asked about the last job. 6 In addition, for all individuals, regardless of whether working at the time of the interview, questions about pension coverage were asked for as many as three past jobs that lasted five years or more.
7 Second, and importantly, for all jobs for which the individual indicated pension coverage, the HRS contacted those firms to obtain summary plan descriptions (SPD) for all pensions at the firm.
8 These SPDs were then matched to HRS individuals based on individual characteristics. Over all pension-covered jobs, the match rates were 65 percent (or 2,896 jobs) of those working, 66 percent (or 915 jobs) for the last job for those not working, and 35 percent (or 994 jobs) for the most recent previous job held five years or longer. It should be emphasized that these matched firm data, distributed as the HRS Wave 1 Pension Plan Detail Data Set, do not include individual-level information on contributions or balances. Instead, they contain plan type, eligibility rules, benefit formulae, employer contribution rates, early and normal retirement dates, and other information described in the SPD.
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A unique feature of the HRS is that respondents were asked permission to link their survey responses to administrative earnings histories and benefits records from the Social Security Administration (SSA) (Mitchell, Olson, and Steinmeier, 1996) . In addition, information on wages and salaries taken from IRS Form W-2 for all jobs held are available from 1980-1991, distributed 1980-1991, 401(k) contributions can be calculated with the above method only for 1984-1991. Thus, total lifetime 401(k) contributions will tend to be understated using this method with the W-2 data, but this will be small because relatively few workers in 1981-1983 contributed to a 401(k) plan (U.S. Department of Labor, 2000) .
Second, this method is feasible only for individuals with annual earnings below the Social Security taxable maximum earnings level. 12 The key feature is that Social Security Wages reported in the matched W-2 records represent all wage compensation. Obviously, this will not be the case for high-income earners who exceed the Social Security taxable maximum. An average of 5 percent of workers had annual earnings that exceeded the Social Security cap in 1984 -1991 (Social Security Administration, 1999 , so that 401(k) contributions cannot be calculated for a relatively small fraction of HRS individuals. Naturally, this is a drawback, primarily because high-income individuals are comparatively more likely to contribute to 401(k) plans.
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Third, and importantly, amounts placed in flexible benefit plans through employee salary reduction, such as premium conversion plans, cafeteria plans, and flexible spending accounts (including medical and dependent care reimbursement accounts), are exempt from both Social Security and Federal income tax (Employee Benefit Research Institute, 1997). Their existence does not affect the method of calculating 401(k) contributions. To see this, let a be the annual amount an individual places in a medical reimbursement account. The amount reported in the Wages, Tips, and Other Compensation 12 W-2s also contain direct information on 401(k) contributions. For example, Box 13 on the 2001 W-2 indicates the exact amount of the contribution and an alphabetic code as to the type of plan, e.g., 401(k), 403(b), 457, etc. In addition, whether the individual is in a pension-covered job is indicated in a checked box on the form. With this information, it would be possible to measure contributions (and pension coverage) for all workers, not just those under the FICA cap. Unfortunately, this information does not appear in the HRS W-2 database, and was not covered in the information release consent form signed by the HRS respondent, and so will not be available to HRS researchers. It should be emphasized that even though there are 18 possible alphabetic codes in Box 13, only those for elective deferrals generate a wedge between the FICA and federal wages. Many of these codes are for reasons unrelated to saving behavior, for example, moving expenses. See Joulfaian and Richardson (2001) for an analysis of the alphabetic codes on the W-2. 13 Prior to 1991, the maximum taxable earnings levels were the same for the Social Security and Medicare payroll taxes. However, in 1991, these maxima diverged: the Social Security taxable maximum was $53,400 and the Medicare taxable maximum was $125,000 (both in nominal dollars). Therefore, in principle, this method can be applied even for individuals above the Social Security but below the Medicare cap in 1991. To ensure comparability across calendar years, we used only individuals below the Social Security cap in 1991. Results that include those individuals above the Social Security but below the Medicare caps, respectively, are available from the authors upon request.
box on the W-2 will be total earnings less 401(k) contributions less the medical reimbursement amount, i.e., y -c -a. The amount reported in the Social Security Wages box on the W-2 will be total earnings less the medical reimbursement amount, i.e., y -a. Then, the difference between W-2 Wages, Tips, and Other Compensation and Social Security Wages will measure (y -a) -(y -c -a) = c, which is 401(k) contributions.
14 Finally, non-qualified plans, such as executive compensation and top-hat plans, allow employees to defer compensation that would appear on the W-2 like 401(k) contributions using our method. The HRS did not ask about these type of plans in the survey and the W-2 database does not include amounts from the "NonQualified" plan box as a field, so there is no way to independently confirm how important these plans are in affecting our measure of 401(k) contributions. However, as described, our method only applies to those individuals with earnings below the FICA cap, and because executives likely earn well above this cap, it seems unlikely a priori this is much of a concern. 15 The key advantage of the W-2 records is that they provide administrative data on contributions and earnings, which minimizes the influence of measurement error in these variables in the estimation. However, because the W-2 does not indicate eligibility for a 401(k), it cannot be determined whether a zero contribution on the W-2 is because the individual was eligible but chose not to contribute or was merely not eligible. In addition, some 401(k)-type arrangements are not entirely voluntary, but require contributions from employees as a condition of eligibility. Pre-tax mandatory employee contributions will appear as deferred compensation on the W-2, but are not indicated separately from voluntary saving.
To isolate voluntary saving, the dependent variable in the empirical analysis, it is necessary to calculate the mandatory component. 16 We do this by matching to each W-2 record the pension plan characteristics from all plans for that job from the matched employer-provided SPDs described above.
17 Given the plan description and individual characteristics like earnings, age, and years of service, we can calculate directly for each calendar year 14 There is one form of compensation that may appear like 401(k) contributions using this method. The fair market value of employer-provided qualified adoption benefits are excluded from federal income taxation but included in the Social Security wage base. Any individual who received such benefits would appear to have deferred compensation through a 401(k) using this method. Although the HRS does not provide enough information on whether respondents were eligible for such adoption benefits, only a tiny fraction of HRS individuals in our sample ever adopted children, so that this is likely not a significant measurement issue. A review of the tax treatment of employee compensation indicates that W-2 Wages will not be greater than Social Security Wages because there are no components of wage compensation that are subject to the Federal income tax, but not the Social Security payroll tax. We excluded statutory employees from our analysis. 15 Elective deferrals to employee stock purchase plans (ESPP) are often mentioned as an unmeasured compensation source using our method. The HRS did not ask about these plans. Although these plans allow for deferrals through payroll deduction, those deferrals are on an after-tax basis (National Center for Employee Ownership, 2001) . Their desirability comes from the preferential capital gains tax treatment. Other forms of compensation, such as employee stock options, that have complicated payroll tax treatment, were not widespread in our period of analysis for the comparatively lower-to middle-income workers we examine. 16 We make a clear distinction between mandatory employee and employer contributions. The latter arise in defined contribution plans, such as money purchase plans, where the employer is required to make a periodic contribution usually based on salary or some combination of salary, age, years of service, etc. The mandatory contributions we refer to in the text are those the employee is required to make out of wage compensation as a condition of eligibility. 17 The employer-provided pension plan data were for jobs the individual self-reported in the employment sections of the survey. Because the W-2 database includes records for all jobs, including ones not retrospectively self-reported in the employment sections, we had to match "self-reported" jobs to "W-2" jobs in order to link the two databases. Details of the algorithm we used to do this are available upon request.
eligible the employee mandatory pre-tax contribution, and then subtract it from the "total" 401(k) contribution from the W-2 to arrive at the voluntary contribution.
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Overall, we use an unbalanced panel sample for 1984-1991 of 3,875 person-year observations on 869 HRS individuals that comprise 798 households.
19 Each individual in the sample is in a job that offers a 401(k).
20 Table 1 shows summary statistics on contributions in the sample. Panel A shows total contributions, the amount of deferred compensation shown on the W-2. In the full sample, the percent contributing in column (1) rises rapidly from 45 percent to almost 68 percent in 1984 and 1989, respectively. By 1991, almost 69 percent of 401(k)-eligible individuals deferred some compensation. The average real contribution (conditional on contributing) shown in column (3) also rose over time and was almost $2,200 when all years are pooled. However, as discussed above, not all of these contributions were voluntary, because some plans require individuals to make pre-tax contributions out of wages and salary as a term of eligibility. This can be true for both defined contribution and defined benefit plans. As shown in panel B, almost 12 percent of individuals in 1991 had plans with mandatory employee pre-tax contributions. In addition, this mandatory component was not trivial: conditional on having had a mandatory component, the real mandatory contribution averaged around $1,200 when all years are pooled. Because these contributions are not "voluntary," they must be subtracted from the total contributions to arrive at the truly voluntary contributions. These are shown in panel C. The mean and median real contribution (conditional on having made a voluntary contribution) were $2,065 and $1,565, respectively, in the pooled sample. Columns (7) and (8) show contributions expressed as a percentage of individual and household earnings, respectively. 21 The mean percentages contributed voluntarily out of individual and household earnings in the pooled sample were 6.2 and 4.7 percent, respectively. These contribution rates are quite similar to those found in previous studies (General Accounting Office, 1997). 18 The earnings we used to calculate the mandatory contributions (as well as the voluntary minima and maxima described in the text) were the FICA earnings from the W-2. In general, companies define the wage base for the purposes of the 401(k) plan in different ways. It may include all compensation but also a mix of bonuses, stock option income, etc. Unfortunately, the pension plan characteristics database from the employer-provided SPDs does not spell out the 401(k) wage base. In addition, even though amounts placed in flexible benefit plans through employee salary reduction, such as premium conversion plans, cafeteria plans, and flexible spending accounts (including medical and dependent care reimbursement accounts), are exempt from FICA tax, and do not affect the calculation of pre-tax deferrals, their presence will understate the overall wage and salary compensation when the FICA earnings are used as the compensation measure. To the extent the FICA earnings and the 401(k) wage base diverge for either of these reasons, the mandatory contributions, voluntary minima and maxima will be measured with error. Unfortunately, there is no way to validate how large this might be in these HRS data. 19 The difference between the 869 individuals and the 798 households just listed was due to 71 households that had 401(k) eligibility for both spouses in our sample. The incorporation of both sets of 401(k) incentives into a single household measure was extremely difficult because of, in general, the complex interaction of plans within the household. Therefore, we treated the person-year observations from two individuals from the same household as repeated observations on the household in the maximum likelihood estimation below and the standard errors were calculated accordingly. The results were not sensitive to this assumption. If the 71 households with dual eligibility were excluded from the sample, the estimation results did not change. 20 Whether the job offers a 401(k)-type arrangement is determined from the employer-provided plan data, not the individual's self-reported pension information in the employment sections of the survey. 21 Earnings refer to labor income subject to the FICA tax. We are not able to measure capital income for any of the households in the 1984-91 period we examined. Obviously, individual and household earnings only can differ for married couples.
ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK
We model the decision to contribute to a 401(k) as follows. Let s* be the desired annual real contribution to a 401(k) and let i and t index individuals and calendar time periods, respectively. Then let desired contributions be a linear function of a vector, x, that contains a constant, characteristics of the individual, spouse, and 401(k) plan, and a random error term, ε,
Let s it min be the minimum voluntary contribution. As a baseline, this minimum is one dollar. However, because there may A. Total Contributions 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 Pooled B. Mandatory Contributions 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 Pooled C. Voluntary Contributions 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 Pooled Note: The descriptive statistics presented above were calculated on the sample of 3,875 person-year observations described in the text. All dollar figures are expressed in real 1992 dollars. be fixed costs of administering 401(k) accounts, many plans require a minimum greater than one dollar to discourage very small account balances, so that s it min could be well above one. Many of these minima are calculated according to formulas based on age, years of service and pay, so that the minima may vary across individuals and time even within a plan, which is why s it min is indexed by i and t. Panel A in Table  2 shows the variation in the mininum voluntary contributions in the sample. Overall, about 59 percent of the person-year observations in the sample faced a minimum voluntary contribution (column (1)). Conditional on having had such a limit, the mean amount of the limit was $384 (column (3)), or 1.4 percent of individual earnings (column (7)). 
Finally, the probability that desired saving is greater than or equal to the voluntary maximum is
Again, the plan-specific upper limits are often described in terms of formulas involving age, years of service and pay, so that s it max varies across individuals and time even within a plan. Panel B in Table 2 shows the variation in the maximum voluntary contributions in the sample. Overall, the mean amount of the limit was $4,823 (column (2)), which represented 16.6 and 13.1 percent of individual and household earnings, respectively (columns (7) and (8)).
One of the fundamental difficulties with previous studies using cross-sectional data is that unobserved heterogeneity in saving behavior can bias estimated saving effects. In particular, some individuals are savers. They save through 401(k)s but also have unobserved qualities correlated with observed explanatory variables. As a result, estimates of the effect of explanatory variables on 401(k) contributions would be biased and inconsistent. Unlike other studies, we have panel data and can account for this heterogeneity in the estimation. Specifically, we let the error term in [1] be composed of two components, One of the fundamental drawbacks of the previous literature is the failure to account for the effect of tax policy on the contribution decision. To analyze the effect of taxation, and, more generally, employer matching, on 401(k) saving, let τ it denote the tax rate of household i in time period t. Let T it be the investment horizon
from the perspective of period t, so that a contribution in t is expected to be withdrawn (at retirement) in T periods. Let τ iT be the tax rate in the withdrawal period. Also, let m it be the employer match rate on employee 401(k) contributions and ξ it+T it is the fraction of the employer match in period t that is vested in T periods. Then, the value at retirement of one pretax dollar contributed to a 401(k) in period t is
We assume that the household views the closest substitute for voluntary retirement saving to be an IRA. Let γ it be the fraction of a pre-tax dollar contributed to an IRA that is not tax deductible. Then the value at retirement of a pre-tax dollar contributed to an IRA in period t is
When γ it = 0, the IRA is fully deductible, and [13] reduces to
When γ it = 1, the IRA is completely nondeductible, and [13] reduces to
Both [14] and [15] are well known and were derived in Wise (1994, 1995) and Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994) , respectively. Therefore, we define the relative tax benefit from contributing to a 401(k) to be the quotient of [12] to [13],
The larger this quotient, the larger the contribution to a 401(k), ceteris paribus. This measure varies along a number of dimensions in our sample. First, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) generated cross-household, cross-time variation in marginal tax rates through changes in the rate and bracket structure. In addition, the top rate was raised to 31 percent in 1991. Because 401(k) contributions are tax-deductible, observed marginal tax rates are endogenous, as they depend on the level of contributions. To avoid problems with endogeneity, we use the first-dollar federal marginal tax rate for τ, calculated for each household using Internet TAXSIM at the NBER.
22 Table 3 shows the variation in first-dollar marginal tax rates in the sample. 23 The effect of TRA86 is clear in the mean tax rate in column (1), which fell from 26 to 21 percent over the sample period. A comparison of the tax rates at the 10 th and 25 th percentiles with those in the 75 th and 95 th percentiles indicates that the tax rates fell by more in the upper parts of the tax rate distribution than in the lower parts, as is well known.
Second, prior to TRA86, IRA contributions were fully tax-deductible up to the limit of $2,000 for single individuals and $2,250 for married couples. TRA86 limited the deductibility of contributions. For single individuals, contributions remained fully deductible if adjusted gross income was less than $25,000, were linearly phased out for incomes between $25,000 and $35,000, and completely nondeductible for incomes above $35,000. For married couples, contributions remained fully deductible if adjusted gross income was less than $40,000, were linearly phased out for incomes between $40,000 and $50,000, and completely non-deductible for incomes above $50,000. Therefore, γ varies according to a non-linear inter-
action of income level, marital status, and time period. Column (7) of Table 3 shows the time-series variation in the mean percentage of the IRA that is not deductible, γ, in the sample. Naturally, γ is zero prior to 1986 and then jumps to a mean of 34 percent in 1987 once TRA86 begins to take hold. Third, we calibrate the investment horizon to be 65 minus age in period t, so that T varies due to age and time variation in the sample. Fourth, we assume that the household considers the current rate of return, r t , to hold until retirement. We define that return to be the weighted-average return on a portfolio consisting of two-thirds bonds and one-third stocks taken from Ibbotson Associates (1997). Because this return is updated each period, there is additional time-series variation in [16] . Finally, there is cross-household, cross-time variation in the employer match rate. Not all plans offer matches, the match rate varies among those that do, and not all plans offered matches in all of the sample time periods. 24 22 Even though the econometric model was framed in terms of individuals, it is the household marginal tax rate that matters here. 23 The HRS provides state FIPS codes to indicate state of residence at the time of the first interview in 1992. Because of stipulations spelled out in the Memorandum of Understanding between the Social Security Administration, Internal Revenue Service, and the University of Michigan (where the HRS is housed), the W-2 and the Social Security Earnings and Benefits data cannot be merged to the FIPS codes (neither can the employer-provided pension plan data we use), so that it is not possible to calculate state marginal tax rates for individuals and households in our sample. Moreover, even if that were possible, retrospective questions on place of residence prior to 1992 were not asked in the first interview, so that state of residence could not be calculated for our 1984-1991 sample. The finest level of geographic information available for our dataset is the nine Census regions, and for 1992 only, so that we used only federal marginal tax rates in our analysis. In addition, the Memorandum of Understanding stipulates that the restricted-access data be housed on a stand-alone computer. Even though Internet TAXSIM at the NBER was used to generate the first-dollar marginal tax rates for this study, no restricted-access data were sent over the Internet for these calculations. Details of how we accomplished this are available from the authors upon request. 24 In addition, the vesting rules for matching contributions vary across plans, so that, in principle, ξ it+T it , the fraction of the employer match in period t that is vested in T periods, could vary across individuals and time periods. However, given the various vesting rules for plans in our sample, employer matching contributions for voluntary contributions by the oldest individual in the sample, 62, are vested fully by the time that individual reaches 65 so that effectively there is no independent variation in ξ it+T it in the sample.
Year Mean 25th 50th 75th Note: The descriptive statistics presented above were calculated on the sample of 3,875 person-year observations described in the text. First-dollar marginal tax rates refer to the federal marginal tax rate on the first dollar of capital income for the household. These were calculated based on household income and demographic characteristics using the NBER TAXSIM calculator. The figures in column (7) are the author's calculations based on household income, demographics, and the appropriate calendar year tax rules. Table 4 shows the sample variation in employer matching. Overall, 38 percent of the person-year observations in the sample had employers that matched some portion of the voluntary contribution (column (1)). Because a relatively small number of plans had multi-tiered matching schedules, the table shows summary statistics in columns (2)- (6) for the match rate on the first dollar voluntarily contributed. 25 The mean and median match rates (for those with matches) were 60 and 50 percent, respectively (columns (3) and (5)). The largest match rate in the sample was 200 percent and the smallest was 10 percent. In addition, the bottom portion of Table 4 indicates that employer matching is more common in stand-alone 401(k) plans.
Finally, there is the household's tax rate in the withdrawal period (retirement), τ iT . Unfortunately, there has been very little empirical analysis of the extent to which marginal tax rates decline at retirement. One exception is Burman, Gale, and Weiner (2001) . They used a large panel of income tax returns from the Continuous Work History Survey (CWHS) that allowed them to hold household characteristics fixed. They calculated marginal tax rates on IRA contributions and withdrawals by income category under a number of different tax law, contribution, and withdrawal scenarios. To measure how much marginal tax rates fall at retirement, we used the percentage difference between marginal tax rates for households that contributed in 1982 and withdrew in 1995 but were treated as if the 1995 tax law had applied in 1982. These were taken from Burman, Gale, and Weiner (2001) , Table 3 . These "constant-law" marginal tax rates provide a clean measure of the effect of retirement on marginal tax rates holding household characteristics and tax law fixed. Because Burman, Gale, and Weiner found that the decline in rates across retirement varied by income level, we multiplied the period t marginal tax rate, τ it , by the respective percentage decline in marginal tax rates at retirement to generate a first-dollar marginal tax rate on capital income while retired, τ iT .
Our basic specification of the index function, βx, in [1] is
in which the relative tax advantage of a contribution to a 401(k) over an IRA is In the baseline specification, the vector z includes dummy variables for marital status, race, calendar years (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) , and whether the individual (couple) had any children, as well as the education and age of the individual and spouse, respectively. To test whether 401(k) saving declines either during or in anticipation of children's college attendance, we included variables for the number of children 19-23 years old and 13-18 years old, respectively. In addition, three controls for income were included: current household earnings, y it , measured as the sum of individual and spouse W-2 earnings in period t, a measure of expected household lifetime earnings, and the expected household annual Social Security benefit. Current and lifetime earnings are predicted to have a positive effect on 401(k) contributions, whereas higher Social Security benefits should offset 401(k) saving. Finally, dummy variables are included for household non-401(k) pension coverage on the current and past jobs (described in detail below) to measure the offset to 401(k) saving from alternative pension coverage. 26 In addition, equation [21] allows the effects of deductibility and matching to differ, whereas [18] constrained those effects to be equal. For all of the specifications shown in Table 6 , we could reject the null hypothesis that these effects were equal at the 5 percent significance level based on a likelihood ratio test. ) + η it using a one-limit Tobit model on all person-year observations in the Social Security earnings database with positive covered earnings. Equation [22] employs a flexible functional form that allows for time-varying returns to education, timevarying quadratic age-earnings profiles, time-varying white-non-white earnings gaps, as well as pure calendar-year effects on earnings. In addition, the specification allows for time-invariant differences in earnings due to the individual's father's and mother's education, Census region of birth, and race-Census-region-of-birth interaction, all of which we interpret as part of the individual's human capital endowment. To calculate LE it Actual , we gave the individual their actual covered earnings for each year below the FICA cap and the predicted earnings from [22] for each year above the cap, then deflated into real 1992 dollars using the All-Items CPI, and summed the real annual earnings from 1951 to t.
V it
The second part of expected average household lifetime earnings is due to the annual earnings the individual would be forecast to earn for the remainder of the working life, denoted LE it Forecast . This was calculated by using the parameter estimates from [22] to forecast earnings growth from each period t until retirement. By the first interview in 1992, age-eligible HRS respondents were between ages 51 and 61 and some individuals in our sample had retired already. Because voluntary 401(k) saving and the timing of retirement decisions are likely jointly determined, we did not use actual age at retirement in our calculations. Instead, given the age range of HRS individuals, we assumed that all individuals in our sample worked until age 62 (the Social Security early retirement age) for the purposes of forecasting future earnings. This has the virtue of giving an exogenous retirement age for each individual. Thus, we took forecast annual earnings from period t + 1 to "retirement" (age 62), deflated into real 1992 dollars, and summed to yield LE it Forecast . Finally, we added real annual actual and forecast earnings to yield expected lifetime earnings and divided by years of potential labor market experience to yield the individual's expected average lifetime earnings,
For married couples, we summed [23] for both spouses. Because the retirement age of 62 was chosen, the Social Security variable measures the expected annual Social Security early retirement benefit. For an individual i in time period t, it was calculated using the same lifetime earnings profile used to calculate LE it in [23] above along with the Social Security program rules and exr=1 R r=1 R pressed in real 1992 dollars. For married couples, benefits first were calculated according to each spouse's earnings profile and then the couple was allowed to claim the maximum household benefit allowed by the program rules.
Descriptive statistics for all of the explanatory variables are given in Table 5 . The maximum likelihood random effects estimates for the specification in [21] are shown in column (1) of Table 6 . Standard errors are in parentheses and account for the unbalanced panel. 27 Estimates of the earnings equation in [22] /V IRA )′ after 1986 is 0.065. Therefore, evaluated at this mean, the limitation of IRA deductibility raised 401(k) saving by $51 (i.e., 788.5 × .065 = 51). But the sample mean 401(k) contribution was $1,235, so that the change in deductibility from TRA86 raised 401(k) saving by 4.2 percent (i.e., 51/1235 = 0.042), which is shown in column (1) of panel B at the bottom of Table 6 .
The estimated effect of employer matching, ln(1 + mξ), is positive, α 2 = 511.0, and statistically significant at the 1.5 percent level. For those plans with no employer match, ln(1 + mξ) = 0. Thus, when evaluated at the sample mean of ln(1 + mξ) for the subsample with a match of 0.456, employer matching is associated with an increase in 401(k) saving of $233 (i.e., 511 × .456 = 233) or 19 percent of mean contributions (i.e., 233/1235 = 0.19), as shown in panel B.
The other parameter estimates are interesting as well. Contributions rise with current and expected lifetime household earnings. The estimated marginal propensity to save through a 401(k) out of current earnings is 0.038. From the estimates of the calendar year effects, there is a clear upward trend in 401(k) contributions from 1984 to 1991. Older, more educated, and childless households have higher 401(k) contributions, in accordance with findings of previous studies. There is no evidence that the 401(k) saving is differential among households with children of different ages; in particular, saving is not lower for those with college-aged children. The estimates of σ ν 2 and σ u 2 suggest that about 62 percent of the error variance is due to the individual-specific heterogeneity.
Basic economic intuition would suggest that 401(k) contributions should be quite sensitive to whether or not the household has pension coverage from other, non-401(k) pensions. For example, if covered by a defined benefit plan, an individual rationally may save less through a 401(k) because the employer is effectively saving for retirement for the individual. Likewise, for a married couple, if the spouse has pension coverage, an individual may choose to contribute less to a 401(k). The specification in column (1) includes dummy variables for whether the individual has coverage through a pension plan other than a 401(k) (i.e., defined benefit or non-401(k) defined contribution plan) on the current job, whether the spouse has or ever had pension coverage (if married), whether the individual had pension coverage on the most recent previous job, and whether the individual had pension coverage on any prior jobs other 27 The standard errors do not account for the fact that part of the independent variation in the level and expected growth in lifetime earnings is due to future forecasts based on the parameter estimates from the earnings equation in [22] . than the most recent previous job, respectively. 28 The parameters associated with these dummies measure the offset to 401(k) saving from pension coverage of that type. The estimates in column (1) indicate that other coverage on the current job is associated with lower 401(k) contributions by an average of $362. Relative to the sample mean contribution of $1,235, this implies a non-401(k) pension coverage offset to 401(k) saving of -0.29, or -29 percent, shown in panel B. This effect is statistically significant and economically large. Pension coverage through a spouse or previous jobs also is associated with significantly lower 401(k) saving, suggesting an overall large non-401(k) pension offset to 401(k) saving. 29 Finally, an increase in annual Social Security benefits lowers 401(k) saving. While this estimate is statistically significantly different from zero, the economic magnitude of the offset is quite small, only 3.2 percent. (19) and (20) in the text, respectively. 28 In terms of the HRS wave 1 questionnaire, the "current job" refers to the section F or G job, the "most recent previous job" refers to the first section H job, and, the "prior jobs other than the most recent previous job" refers to the second and third section H jobs. The dummy variable for non-401(k) pension coverage on the current job was constructed from the HRS restricted-access pension plan characteristics database based on the matched SPDs. The remaining pension coverage dummies were constructed from the self-reported information in sections F, G, and H of the wave 1 survey. 29 Although the largest offset (almost full offset) occurs for prior pension covered jobs other than the most recent previous job, very few (only 5.2 percent as shown in Table 5 ) of individuals in the sample had such coverage. 30 Estimates from the large previous literature of the Social Security offset to private saving have varied substantially, with the range of estimates encompassing both full crowd out and even some crowd in. Those studies are reviewed extensively in Feldstein and Liebman (2001) . In column (2), dummy variables are added for whether the individual can direct the investment of the voluntary and employer matching balances in the plan, respectively. In particular, individuals rationally may choose to contribute relatively less to a 401(k) if the plan does not allow for the flexibility in portfolio diversification that other saving vehicles offer. The portfolio implications of 401(k)s have been a subject of much recent research (Poterba, Shoven, and Sialm, 2000; Shoven, 1999; Shoven and Sialm, 1999; Benartzi and Thaler, 2001; Papke, 2002 ; among others). The estimates in column (2) suggest that individuals who are allowed to direct the investment of the voluntary contributions contribute an average of $334 more, or, relative to the mean contribution of $1,235, an increase of 27 percent. This effect is statistically significant and economically very large. Interestingly, the ability to direct the employer matching contributions also is associated with an appreciable effect on 401(k) saving in column (2), but this effect is not consistent across specifications shown in the remaining columns. Unfortunately, the pension characteristics from the SPD do not indicate other, more subtle, features of the plan that might be correlated with whether the plan allows participant-directed investment, but also independently raise saving, such as plan promotion at the establishment, the frequency of account statements, etc. Therefore, these effects may not be ascribed as causal necessarily.
30
Of course, saving decisions may be influenced by liquidity. In general, there are three ways an individual can access 401(k) balances prior to retirement. First, the individual can terminate employment and elect a lump-sum distribution.
31 Essentially, this option, though a costly way to access funds, is available to all individuals. Second, if the plan allows, the individual can elect a hardship withdrawal without terminating employment. Finally, if the plan allows, the individual can borrow against the plan balance. Therefore, the specification in column (3) adds dummy variables for whether the plan allows hardship withdrawals and borrowing, respectively. The estimates suggest that conditional on individual and spouse characteristics, the rich controls for income, other pension coverage, tax deductibility, employer matching, and the ability to direct investment, access to funds through hardship withdrawals or borrowing has statistically insignificant and economically very small effects on 401(k) contribution behavior. One difficulty in interpreting the estimated effects of plan features such as the match, directed investment, and liquidity in columns (1)- (3) is that they may be contaminated by unmeasured firm characteristics that independently affect 401(k) saving and happen to be correlated with plan features. The specifications in columns (4) and (5) attempt to control for these effects using the limited set of firm and job characteristics gathered in the HRS wave 1 survey. The specification shown in column (4) includes dummy variables for the size of the establishment. The excluded establishment size category is less than 100 workers. The parameter estimates suggest that, other things equal, individuals at small establishments (less than 100) contribute more than at medium and large establishments. The other parameter estimates continue to suggest economically sizeable and statistically significant impacts of tax deductibility, employer matching, other pension coverage, and individually directed investment on 401(k) saving.
The specification in column (5) includes dummy variables for industry, occupation, and union status. 32 Most of the parameter estimates are unchanged by these additional control variables, including the impact of tax deductibility and individually directed investment of the voluntary balances. The key exceptions are the estimates associated with the employer match and the dummy for whether the individual can direct the investment of the match.
Indeed, whereas the specifications in columns (1)-(4) produced economically large estimates of the effect of matching on 401(k) saving, the estimate in column (5) suggests that the employer match has essentially no effect on saving, once industry, occupation, and union status are taken into account. We think this is an important conclusion given that, for the most part, the previous literature has estimated models with a smaller, less rich set of control variables and many studies have found that employer matching raises 401(k) saving. Our results suggest these previous results might be spurious. However, we also want to emphasize that once age and income are accounted for, the match rate may have relatively little independent variation, particularly within industry-occupation cells in column (5), and it may be this lack of across-time variation that yields such a small estimate. Unfortunately, the sample is not sufficiently large to convincingly disentangle these two explanations, so we leave this as an open issue. We do note, however, that Kusko, Poterba, and Wilcox (1998) used administrative data on over 12,000 employees from 1988-1991 at a single firm that varied its match rate substantially across this period and found very little responsiveness of 401(k) saving to the match rate. So, our results in column (5) are not inconsistent with their findings.
To sum up, across columns in Table 6 , the estimates suggest that the TRA86 limit on the deductibility of IRA contributions raised 401(k) saving by 3 to 6 percent, with the largest and most precisely estimated effects coming in the richest specifications in columns (4) and (5). Across all specifications, alternative pension coverage is generally associated with substantial reductions in saving, suggesting a large non-401(k) pension offset to 401(k) saving. This is consistent with Engelhardt (2001) who analyzed asset balances in wave 1 (1992) of the HRS. Finally, the ability to direct investment of the voluntary balance is associated with very large increases in 401(k) saving, averaging about 45 percent across all specifications. For the reasons outlined above, we cannot conclude this is a causal effect necessarily, but is clearly an avenue for future research.
CONCLUSION
This study uses a unique dataset on households in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to examine the responsiveness of 401(k) saving to tax policy, employer matching, and lifecycle factors. Specifically, the analysis is based on panel data from W-2 earnings records for jobs held in 1984-1991 by HRS individuals, matched to Social Security covered-earnings histories back to 1951, and employerprovider summary plan descriptions for all eligible pensions. Unlike the small number of previous studies, these combined data sources allow us to model longitudinally 401(k) saving as a function of taxes, lifetime earnings and characteristics of the 401(k) and other pension plans for which the household is eligible. Importantly, we exploited the panel data to account directly for unobserved heterogeneity in saving behavior.
Based on the maximum likelihood random effects estimates of the determinants of 401(k) contributions, there are four important findings. First, the limit on the tax deductibility of IRA contributions enacted in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) appears to have raised 401(k) saving by as much as 6 percent. Second, employer matching raises 401(k) saving by about 19 percent in simple specifications, but these results are not robust in the richest specification, which suggests that matching may have little impact on 401(k) saving. Third, pension coverage by plans other than a 401(k) is associated with a substantial reduction in 401(k) saving. Finally, the ability of the participant to direct investment of the voluntary balance in the 401(k) is associated with a large increase in saving.
There are a number of important caveats to this study. First, although the HRS data are rich and well suited for the analysis of retirement saving behavior, its primary disadvantage is that it only covers one birth cohort (i.e., those born 1931-41). The estimated saving effects may not apply to younger cohorts. Second, the estimation relies on a selected sample of individuals, namely, those who gave permission to match W-2 and Social Security records, had earnings less that the FICA cap, and for whom employer-provided SPDs could be matched. Again, any policy implications are most appropriately drawn for households similar to those under study here. Finally, and more fundamentally, because many 401(k) plans have limits on the extent of employer matching contributions (e.g., match 50 percent up to 6 percent of wages and salary), most employer matching provisions generate non-linear, kinked intertemporal budget sets. Analysis of saving behavior in the presence of kinked budget sets requires full structural estimation to separate income from substitution effects. This study stops well short of that. Hence, the empirical estimates presented above should be thought of as reduced form in nature and represent the net effect of employer matching on 401(k) saving. Struc-
